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Microfinance contracts have proven able to secure high rates of loan repayment in the 
face of limited liability and information asymmetries, but high repayment rates have not 
translated easily into profits for most microbanks.  Profitability, though, is at the heart of 
the promise that microfinance can deliver poverty reduction while not relying on ongoing 
subsidy.  We examine why this promise remains unmet for most institutions.  Using a 
data set with unusually high-quality financial information on 124 institutions in 49 
countries, we explore the patterns of profitability, loan repayment, and cost reduction.  
We find that institutional design and orientation matter substantially.  Lenders that do not 
use group-based methods to overcome incentive problems experience weaker portfolio 
quality and lower profit rates when interest rates are raised substantially.  For these 
individual-based lenders, one key to achieving profitability is investing more heavily in 
staff costs—a finding consistent with the economics of information but contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that profitability is largely a function of minimizing cost.  
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The economics of information shows how information asymmetries undermine credit 
markets in places where potential customers have few assets to offer as collateral (e.g., 
Besley, 1995).  But microfinance would be a grand failure if this was all there was to it.  
Innovative contracts and new microfinance management practices have proven capable of 
generating high loan repayment rates in contexts as diverse as the slums of Dhaka, war-
torn Bosnia, and rural Senegal.  In doing so, microfinance practitioners have forced 
economic theorists to re-think pessimistic views on the prospect for lending profitably to 
the poor.    
Recent theoretical work describes how these innovations work to secure loan 
repayments, but the analyses focus on only one part of the relevant equation.
1  Meeting 
the full promise of microfinance—to reduce poverty without ongoing subsidies—requires 
translating high repayment rates into profits, a challenge that remains for most 
microbanks.
2   The overall equation linking capital and labor inputs into profits and social 
change still proves difficult to master.    
We take a close look at this equation with unusually high-quality financial 
information on 124 institutions in 49 countries; the institutions are united by claiming 
strong commitments to achieving financial self-sufficiency and a willingness to open 
                                                 
1 A great deal has been written on microfinance theory within the past fifteen years (e.g., Stiglitz, 1990; 
Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane, 1994; Besley and Coate, 1995; Conning, 1999; Ghatak and Guinnane, 
1999; Laffont and Rey, 2003; and Rai and Sjöström, 2004).  Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) 
provide a critical guide to the economics literature on microfinance. 
2 We take this goal on face value, although we recognize the case for subsidized microfinance when social 
benefits sufficiently outweigh social costs and subsidies do not undercut non-subsidized firms.  The goal of 
profit-making microfinance is discussed by Robinson (2003).  Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) 
discuss subsidy and sustainability in their chapter 9.     3
their accounts to careful scrutiny.
3  The institutions thus represent some of the best hopes 
for achieving poverty reduction with profit (or at least without ongoing subsidy).  Still, 
the average share of funding (total liabilities plus total equity) made up of subsidized 
resources exceeds 20 percent in this sample. 
Empirical progress on understanding the trade-offs in microfinance has been held 
back by the lack of variation in prices and program elements necessary for identification 
of key parameters.  Most financial institutions offer their clients a uniform set of products 
and they seldom change the product mix, price, or design—or institutions change policies 
in ways that make it difficult for researchers to disentangle patterns of product changes 
versus other contemporaneous changes.
4  The cross-country data here, however, provide 
substantial variation in contractual types, prices, institutional sizes and locations, and 
target markets.  The variation provides a means to describe the nature and trade-offs of 
lending relationships.    
The data set allows us to examine several important claims for the first time in a 
large comparative survey.  Does raising interest rates exacerbate agency problems as 
detected by lower loan repayment rates and less profitability?  Is there evidence of a 
trade-off between the depth of outreach to the poor and the pursuit of profitability?  Has 
“mission drift” occurred—i.e., have microbanks moved away from serving their poorer 
clients in pursuit of commercial viability?   
                                                 
3 The data were collected as part of the MicroBanking Bulletin project.  Summary statistics on the 
institutions have been made available in the Bulletin.  This paper is based on the underlying data set, access 
to which has kindly been provided (with confidentiality safeguards) to the authors.  The Bulletin is 
available at www.mixmarket.org.  
4 New work using field experiments (e.g., Karlan and Zinman, 2005) or natural experiments (e.g., Dehejia, 
Montgomery, and Morduch, 2005) shows promise in ways to either exploit the variation that exists or to 
create variation as part of a research program.   4
As with other cross-country analyses, the aim is to describe patterns in the data.  
There is insufficient exogenous variation in key variables to reliably estimate causal 
impacts, so we focus on associations that can help illuminate and frame key debates, 
while bearing in mind that the institutions in the survey are more focused on financial 
performance than typical microbanks.  We thus expect that the trade-offs described below 
are even starker for institutions that did not participate in the survey. 
Our results bring some good news for microfinance advocates.  First, over half of 
the institutions in the survey were profitable after accounting adjustments were made 
(although the average return on assets is negative overall).  Others are approaching 
profitability and should be able to soon achieve financial self-sufficiency.  Second, 
simple correlations show little evidence of agency problems, outreach-profit trade-offs, or 
mission drift.  The correlations thus attest to the possibility of raising interest rates 
without undermining repayment rates, to achieving both profit and substantial outreach to 
poorer populations, and to staying true to initial social missions even when aggressively 
pursuing commercial goals.   
Disaggregating by lending type, though, uncovers trade-offs and tensions, even 
among these leading institutions.  The pattern of profitability and the nature of customers 
vary considerably with the design of the institutions and their contracts.  Microfinance 
lenders use a variety of approaches to lending, and we focus on three main categories.  
The best-known approach is “group lending,” made popular within microfinance by the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia.  The method uses self-formed 
groups of customers that assume joint liability for the repayment of loans given to group 
members.  The joint liability contract can, in principle, mitigate moral hazard and adverse   5
selection by harnessing local information and enforcement possibilities and putting them 
to use for the bank.  Another method is village banking, based on larger groups but a 
similar notion of joint liability.   The third main method is “individual-based lending,” 
which draws on traditional banking practices and involves a standard bilateral 
relationship between the bank and customer—and, absent other interventions, is most 
vulnerable to problems imposed by information asymmetries and weak enforcement 
capacities.   
The data set contains institutions representative of each approach: 20 institutions 
based on village banks, 56 individual-based lenders, and 48 group-based lenders. Our 
findings on the latter two groups are generally robust across specifications.    
Consistent with predictions from the economics of information, direct evidence 
on loan repayments shows that the fraction of a lender’s portfolio at risk rises with 
interest rates for most of the 50 institutions based on individual-based lending.  We also 
find that raising interest rates beyond a certain point (60 percent in our estimates) is 
associated with lower profits for individual-based lenders.  The predictions are consistent, 
for example, with the landmark analysis of adverse selection by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981).  
Investing relatively more in the workforce is also associated with greater profit for 
individual-based lenders.  The result is consistent with the theoretical prediction that, 
since individual-based lenders cannot rely on the customers themselves to help with 
screening and monitoring (as under a group method), individual-based lenders must   6
invest relatively more in staff costs to achieve higher levels of profit.  As predicted, 
neither of these relationships holds in this sample for group lenders.
5 
Why is the individual-based approach ever favored over either of the group-based 
methods?  We show that the individual-based lenders here provide substantially larger-
sized loans (five times as large, on average).  Loan size is typically taken as a proxy for 
poverty levels of customers, and the evidence suggests that for customers who are less 
poor and who are willing and able to invest in larger businesses, the group methods 
become cumbersome.  Working with relatively few customers each with larger loans can 
be a path to financial self-sufficiency for lenders.  
 Taking this path veers from the traditional focus of microfinance (with its 
emphasis on making smaller loans at as wide a scale as possible), but the shift could 
improve overall welfare: it is not just the poorest that demand and can take advantage of 
better access to finance.  Moreover, we find some evidence of “reverse mission drift” for 
individual-based lenders as a class: i.e., pursuing higher profits and focusing on poorer 
customers can go hand in hand.   At the same time, the data show that larger microbanks 
on average have lower measures of outreach.  In sum, there appears to be a trade-off in 
the breadth of outreach and the depth of outreach.  The question remains open as to 
whether larger institutions serve an absolutely greater number of the very poor--a 




                                                 
5 Increasing labor costs are associated with greater profitability for the 20 village banks as well, which, 
relative to the pattern of other results, is not consistent with predictions.   7
2. Data and empirical approach 
The data on 124 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 49 developing countries were 
collected by the Microfinance Information Exchange (or the MIX), a not-for-profit 
private organization that aims to promote information exchange in the microfinance 
industry.
6  The database contains one observation per institution from 1999 to 2002. 
Seventy percent of the observations are from 2002.  These data, collected for publication 
in the MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB), have been adjusted to help ensure comparability 
across institutions.  The adjustments, which are summarized in Appendix A, include an 
inflation adjustment, a reclassification of some long-term liabilities as equity, an 
adjustment for the cost of subsidized funding, an adjustment for current-year cash 
donations to cover operating expenses, an in-kind subsidy adjustment for donated goods 
and services, loan loss reserve and provisioning adjustments, some adjustments for write-
offs, and the reversal of any interest income accrued on non-performing loans. 
The institutions have been selected based in large part on the quality and extent of 
their data.  The data set is thus not representative of all microfinance institutions.  They 
do, however, collectively serve a large fraction of microfinance customers worldwide.  A 
sense of the skewed size distribution of microfinance is given by Honohan’s (2004) 
analysis of data provided by the Microcredit Summit organization, a data set whose top 
end largely overlaps the data here.  Honohan (2004, p. 3) finds that “the largest 30 
                                                 
6 Information on the MIX is available at their website www.themix.org.  Data for institutions is available 
via the MIX MARKET, a global, web-based, microfinance information platform accessible via the MIX’s 
website. The MFI data include outreach and impact data, financial data, audited financial statements, and 
general information. The MIX MARKET, previously known as “The Virtual Microfinance Market,” began 
as a project of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The project was 
supported by the government of Luxembourg under the guidance of a sector-wide microfinance Advisory 
Board.  In 2001, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a consortium of donors that promotes 
microfinance worldwide, expanded the scope of the MIX MARKET in collaboration with UNCTAD.  The 
MIX currently receives support from CGAP, the Citigroup Foundation, the Open Society Institute, the 
Rockdale Foundation, and other private foundations.     8
microfinance firms account between them for more than 90 per cent of the clients served 
worldwide by the 234 top firms (and hence for more than three-quarters of those served 
by all of the 2572 firms reporting to the Microcredit Summit).”  While we cannot make a 
similar comparison here, Honohan’s evidence suggests that during the sample period the 
banks here served over half of all microfinance customers worldwide.  
An important feature of our data is qualitative information on the lending style 
employed by the MFI, the range of the services it offers, its profit status, ownership 
structure, and sources of funds.  These detailed data enable us to offer a more complete 
analysis of MFI performance by lending type than has been possible before.
7  Lending 
methods vary across regions, as shown in Table 3.  There are no village banks in East 
Asia in the sample, for example.  Individual-based lending predominates in East Asia and 
the Pacific, while institutions in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa tend to lend through 
group mechanisms.  Institutions in Eastern Europe and North Africa do not strongly favor 
either individual-based or group lending.  
Summary statistics at the bottom of Table 1 indicate that, with the possible 
exception of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), our sample is reasonably balanced 
across regions.  Seventeen percent of the institutions come from Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, another seventeen from Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR).  South Asian (SA) 
institutions comprise ten percent of the sample, while institutions from East Asia and the 
Pacific (EAP) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) comprise nine and seven 
percent, respectively.
8  Institutions from Latin America and the Caribbean comprise forty 
                                                 
7 For example, Hartaska and Nadolnyak (2005) use a subset of the MIX data to investigate whether the 
regulatory environment affects the operational self-sustainability and outreach of MFIs, but they are unable 
to disaggregate by lending type and their self-sustainability measure is unadjusted. 
8 The regional classifications and acronyms are those employed by the World Bank.   9
percent of the sample.  Although we include regional dummy variables in the regressions 
that follow, the regional preferences for certain lending types should be kept in mind 
when interpreting results. 
Dependent variables.  The key dependent variable in our analysis of profitability 
is the financial self-sufficiency (FSS) ratio, a measure of an institution’s ability to 
generate sufficient revenue to cover its costs.
9  Values below one indicate that it is not 
doing so. We prefer the financial self-sufficiency ratio to other measures of financial 
performance because the data are adjusted as described above, and because it offers a 
more complete summary of inputs and outputs than standard financial ratios such as 
return on assets or equity. For robustness, however, we also use as dependent variables an 
unadjusted measure of operation self-sufficiency (OSS) and a measure of adjusted return 
on assets (ROA).
10 
Many of the explanatory variables that we use also contain extreme values as 
summarized in Table 1.  The correlations between FSS, OSS, and ROA are positive and 
significant, but not perfect (ranging from .59 to .90).  The three measures are also 
similarly correlated with a number of our explanatory variables.  For example, the age 
and size of institutions are significantly correlated with all three performance measures 
(Table 2).  Regression analyses allow us to investigate the strength of those correlations  
after controlling for region, lending type, and other relevant covariates. 
                                                 
9 The financial self-sufficiency ratio is adjusted financial revenue divided by the sum of adjusted financial 
expenses, adjusted net loan loss provision expenses, and adjusted operating expenses.  It indicates the 
institution’s ability to operate without ongoing subsidy, including soft loans and grants.  The definition is 
from MicroBanking Bulletin (2005), p. 57. 
10 The operational sustainability ratio is financial revenue divided by the sum of financial expenses 
(unadjusted for implicit subsidies), net loan loss provision expenses, and operating expenses.  It indicates 
the institution’s ability to operate without subsidy and without drawing down capital to pay for operating 
expenses.  Unlike the financial self-sufficiency ratio, the OSS is not adjusted.  Return on assets is measured 
as adjusted net operating income (net of taxes) divided by adjusted average total assets.  Definitions are 
from MicroBanking Bulletin (2005), p. 57.   10
 
 
3. The Microfinance Landscape 
Figure 1 shows basic patterns across the three main institutional types identified in the 
survey:  
1.  “Individual-based lenders”: institutions that use standard bilateral lending 
contracts between a lender and a single borrower.  Liability for repaying 
the loan rests with the individual borrower only, although in some cases 
another individual might serve as a guarantor;  
2.  “Solidarity group lenders”: institutions that employ contracts based on 
joint liability implemented with “solidarity groups” (in the spirit of 
contracts used initially at the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and at 
BancoSol in Bolivia).  Loans are made to individuals, but the group, 
which has between 3 and 10 members depending on the institution and 
location, shoulders responsibility for a loan if a member cannot repay, and  
3.  “Village banks,” where each branch forms a single, large group and is 
given a degree of self-governance (this kind of arrangement was pioneered 
by FINCA and is now employed by organizations like Pro Mujer and 
Freedom from Hunger).   
 
Figure 1 shows that patterns of average revenues and costs vary systematically by 
lending type.  The village banks in the survey charge the highest average interest rates 
and face the highest average costs.  The measure captures both direct interest charges and   11
any additional fees charged by lenders.  The total expense ratio gives the ratio of total 
expenses (including labor and capital costs) to assets.   
Costs outweigh interest revenues, though, and the result is that the average return 
on assets for village banks is negative (–0.08).  The microbanks using solidarity groups 
charge lower interest rates and face lower costs, but again costs exceed revenues and the 
average return on assets is –0.05.  Only for the individual-based lenders in the survey is 
the average return on assets positive, though small (0.01). 
These patterns reflect differences in social mission, target customers, and location 
as much as management strategies. The summary statistics show, for example, that a 
reason that costs are so much higher for village banks and group lenders (relative to 
individual-based lenders) is that they make smaller-sized loans and serve poorer 
populations.  The data in Table 4 show that village banks, the least profitable lending 
type as a class, serve the poorest customers (as proxied by loan size) and their clients are 
more likely to be women.  The customers of village banks and group lenders, for 
example, are largely women: 88 percent and 75 percent, respectively.  In comparison, just 
under half of the customers of individual-based lenders are women (46 percent). 
  The village banks in the survey also make the smallest-sized loans ($149 on 
average), followed by group lenders ($431).  Individual-based lenders made far larger 
average loans on average ($1220).
11  Average loan size is often taken to be a proxy for 
the poverty of customers, and these results are in line with anecdotal evidence about the 
depth of outreach across lending types.  The loan size comparisons are made at official 
exchange rates, though, which can substantially distort the purchasing power of a given 
amount of money in local currency.  Patterns are broadly similar, however, even if the 
                                                 
11 The numbers in this section are from Table 4 below.   12
average loan sizes are deflated by gross national product per capita (a metric often 
preferred by microfinance donors) or deflated by the average income per capita of the 
bottom 20 percent in the country.  For average loan size to GNP per capita, the ratio for 
village banks: solidarity group lenders: individual-based group lenders is 0.20: 0.54: 1.01.  
Where the deflator is the average income per capita of the bottom 20 percent in the 
country, the ratios are 0.63: 1.63: 4.80.  These basic distinctions by lending type play out 
in important ways in the regression analyses below.   
  Table 5 shows that village banks as a class take advantage of subsidies to a 
greater extent than others. The average fraction of subsidies in funding (total liabilities 
plus total equity) is over one-third. For solidarity group-based institutions, the fraction is 
28%, and for individual-based lenders the subsidized share of funding is just 11%.  
  Not surprisingly, receiving more subsidies is negatively correlated with 
profitability. Table 6 shows the sample average correlation coefficient with respect to 
financial self-sufficiency is (-.28), and (-.53) with respect to returns on assets. 
 
4. Regression approach 
The aim of the benchmark regressions is to understand why some microbanks have 
achieved profitability while others have remain reliant on subsidy.  The base regressions 
thus describe the correlates of profitability, focusing particularly on the roles of costs and 
interest rates charged on loans.  We allow these factors to vary by lending type using the 
following reduced-form equation: 
   13
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where FSS is the financial self-sufficiency ratio of microfinance institution i, and Yield is 
the real gross portfolio yield, a measure of interest charges faced by customers, as 
described in Table 1.
12  The gross portfolio yield is the ratio of interest revenues to the 
average size of the loan portfolio.  Because loan losses are not netted out of the revenues, 
this measure is intended to capture the ex-ante interest rate charged by the MFI rather 
than the ex-post interest rate realized on the portfolio. The coefficient matrix β2 includes 
coefficients that show how the effects of Yield vary by lending type, described in greater 
detail below.  In the results that follow, the omitted category is “individual-based 
lenders”.  Thus, there is one Yield coefficient for solidarity group lenders and another for 
village banks.  Each of those coefficients measures the difference between that lending 
type and individual-based lenders with regard to the effect of yields.  The coefficient β1 
thus summarizes the effect of yields on financial self-sufficiency for individual-based 
lenders. 
 The  Cost matrix is comprised of two variables, one measuring capital costs 
relative to assets, the other for labor costs to assets.  Like the yield variable, these two 
cost variables are interacted with the lending type variables.  The lending type variables 
also enter the specification independently. Because they again are the omitted category, 
individual-based lenders do not have their own coefficient. The matrix MFI history 
                                                 
12 The means and medians for FSS, OSS, and ROA are all within the expected range (Table 1), but the 
minimum and maximum values suggest a wide range for each variable, and thus outliers will be a concern 
in the analysis that follows, prompting the use of robust regression methods as a check on robustness to 
outliers.   14
includes two variables, one for age and the other for size (as measured by total assets). 
The matrix Orientation contains three variables that describe the microfinance 
institution’s business practices: the ratio of loans to assets, the average loan size (relative 
to GNP per capita), and a dummy variable indicating the institution’s formal profit status 
(equal to one if the organization is for-profit). Finally, region is a matrix of dummy 
variables for each main region of the developing world, with “Latin America and the 
Caribbean” as the omitted category. 
Having summarized the correlates of profitability, the next set of regressions 
explores the relationship of interest rates and costs for each lending type. We first 
introduce a quadratic term for the gross portfolio yield variable in the profitability 
equations, allowing the quadratic effect to differ across lending types.  The quadratic 
form can generate U-shaped patterns consistent with the prediction that agency problems 
become so severe that overall profitability falls as interest rates rise beyond a point.  This 
result is also consistent with falling demand for credit (and thus diminishing scale 
economies) at high interest rates.  To shed further light on the hypothesis from agency 
theory, we then replace the profit measures with the share of the portfolio that is 
delinquent (portfolio at risk) to test directly whether high interest rates are associated 
with higher rates of non-repayment—and find that they are, but only for individual-based 
lenders.  Moreover, individual-based lenders charging the highest interest rates in our 
sample enjoy better repayment performance than those charging intermediate rates. Yet, 
their lending volumes are substantially lower, a finding that is more consistent with 
falling demand for credit as rates push past threshold values than with predictions from 
agency theory.   15
5. Results 
Financial sustainability 
Table 7 gives the results from the estimation of equation 1 above.  The results show that 
raising interest rates is associated with improved financial performance for individual-
based lenders only.  The coefficient for real gross portfolio yield (the measure of average 
interest rates on loans to customers) is positive and significant across all three 
profitability indicators (financial self-sufficiency, operational sustainability, and return on 
assets), indicating that individual-based lenders tend to be more profitable when their 
average interest rates are higher.  
  The result, in itself, is not surprising, but the same result does not hold for village 
banks or solidarity group lenders.  When summed, the coefficients for yield and the yield 
interactions are not significantly different from zero.  Thus, for both types of group 
lenders there is not a significant relationship between interest rates and profitability, even 
after controlling for costs. 
  We find that labor costs are associated with improved profitability for individual-
based lenders (for all three of our profitability measures).  The labor cost interaction term 
for village banks is positive  but not significant in all specifications, indicating no 
significant difference between them and individual-based lenders.
13  Thus, these two 
types of lenders tend to more than recoup the costs they devote to personnel. One 
possibility, which we explore below, is that identifying creditworthy borrowers is labor-
intensive. Once identified, however, such borrowers receive relatively large loans, 
making this a cost-effective strategy.   
                                                 
13 The labor costs and village bank*labor costs coefficients are also jointly significantly greater than zero in 
all specifications in Table 7.   16
  Group lenders do not follow this strategy.  The coefficient on their labor costs 
variable is negative, significant and of similar magnitude to the simple labor costs 
variable (corresponding to individual-based lenders).  When summed, the coefficients are 
not significantly different from zero at the p=.05 level for any model in Table 7, 
indicating no strong relationship between labor costs and financial performance. 
  Not surprisingly, the benchmark regression shows that rising capital costs reduce 
profitability for individual-based lenders.  The coefficients on the capital costs variables 
also show differences in the way the three types of lenders generate profits.  As 
hypothesized, capital costs (which include rent, transportation, depreciation, office, and 
other expenses) are negatively linked to profitability measures. Therefore, this method of 
cost containment is associated with profit, at least for individual-based lenders.  
  For village banks, rising capital costs are associated with an even sharper decline 
in profitability.  The interaction term for village banks is negative and often significant, 
suggesting that high capital costs hurt their bottom line even more than that of individual-
based lenders.  When summed, the capital costs and village bank*capital costs 
coefficients are significantly less than zero (at the p=.01-.06 level) for all specifications in 
Table 7.  The result suggests that village banks have less room to adjust in the face of 
rising costs.  But we find no significant relationship between capital costs and 
profitability measures for group lenders. 
  Note that neither the village bank nor the solidarity group dummy variable is 
significant in Table 7, indicating that once the effects of costs and yields are permitted to 
vary by lending type, those types explain no additional variation in financial 
performance.   The regional dummy variables do explain some variation in financial   17
performance. Institutions from Eastern Europe and Central Asia and those from South 
Asia out-performed those from other regions in terms of financial self-sufficiency.  An 
institution’s age and size are significantly positively linked to financial performance 
across all three indicators.
14 Finally, neither the indicator for being constituted formally 
as a for-profit bank nor the average loan size variable are strongly linked to the financial 
performance indicators.  The latter result shows that, even after controlling for region and 
other covariates, institutions that make smaller loans are not less profitable on average.
15  
  Given the maximum and minimum values for our variables in Table 1, there is 
some concern that outliers partly drive the results.  We therefore use a robust estimation 
technique that weights observations based on the absolute value of their residuals, in 
which observations with large residuals are assigned smaller weights (Appendix B Table 
1).
16 Those results are similar to the base results, although there are a few minor 
differences. First, the coefficient on the portfolio yield is no longer significant in the OSS 
specifications, which could be because outliers were driving that result in Table 7.  This 
also could be an indication of the importance of the adjustments to the raw data made by 
the MIX.  That is, the unadjusted OSS data might have included outliers that drove a 
spurious positive correlation with yields. In any event, the yield coefficient in the FSS 
and ROA regressions remains positive and significant. The coefficients and significance 
levels for the costs variables are also similar to the base specifications, as are the 
                                                 
14 In addition to controlling for age in the base regressions, we also ran models on subsets of MFIs of 
similar vintage (5-20 years old).  Because the performance indicators for young MFIs are widely dispersed, 
our results are at least as strong when we restrict the sample in this way. See Appendix A for reasons why 
data from young MFIs might be most in need of adjustment.  
15 The basic pattern of results also holds when we control for regional variation in different ways.  For 
example, in unreported specifications we allowed for correlation between observations from the same 
country using clustered standard errors. In another set of unreported specifications, we allowed for random 
effects at the country level. Given the small size of our dataset, we were not able to incorporate country 
fixed effects in our models.  See Deaton (1997, pp. 73-78) for a detailed discussion of clustering. 
16 We use the “rreg” command in STATA.   18
significance levels for age and size (though their coefficients are a bit smaller). In 
general, the robust regression results reinforce our original conclusions. 
 
Interest rates 
The regressions in Table 7 report the average association between portfolio yields and 
financial performance. The results can be extended to shed light on the implications of 
agency theory.  Specifically, when lenders face informational asymmetry and borrowers 
lack collateral, charging interest above a certain threshold could aggravate problems of 
adverse selection.  At such rates, only low-quality borrowers that do not expect to be able 
to repay would find it in their interest to borrow.  If these conjectures are true, one would 
expect to see them reflected in lower repayment rates and profitability for microbanks 
charging relatively high interest rates. 
We test these ideas by including the square of portfolio yield in our base 
specifications. As in previous specifications, we allow the association between the 
squared yield variable and financial performance to vary by lending type. We have a 
relatively small dataset, so that introducing the squared yield terms makes it difficult to 
allow separate labor and capital costs variables for each lending type.  Therefore, those 
costs variables enter the specifications in Table 8 without lending type interactions, and 
are insignificant.  Note that when the costs variables are collapsed in this way, the simple 
dummy variable for group lending becomes positive and significant across profitability 
indicators. 
The results follow the theoretical predictions for individual-based lenders.  The 
main finding from Table 8 is that for individual-based lenders, financial self-sufficiency   19
and operational sustainability are increasing in portfolio yield, but only up to the point at 
which the negative quadratic yield coefficient outweighs the positive linear coefficient.
17  
Both the linear and the squared yield variables are significant.  Figure 2 plots the 
estimated relationship between the financial self-sufficiency ratio and the yield ratio 
based on Table 8, model 3, for an individual-based lender assigned the median value for 
all other variables that enter the regression. As hypothesized, financial self-sufficiency is 
increasing in yield up to a point.  That break point occurs within our sample values for 
portfolio yields for individual-based lenders (60% percent per annum).  However, only 
one individual-based lender had a portfolio yield greater than that value.  The result is 
consistent with individual-based lenders adjusting in order to avoid potential incentive 
problems, and thus opting not to push interest rates beyond threshold values. 
For village banks, coefficients on both the linear and squared yield variables are 
not statistically significant, but similar in magnitude to, and the opposite sign of, the 
simple yield variables (corresponding to effects for individual-based lenders).  Summing 
the respective squared and linear variables, there is no significant relationship between 
yields and our profitability indicators for village banks.   
For group lenders, the coefficients for yield and yield squared are also the 
opposite sign of those for individual-based lenders, but they are much larger in 
magnitude. When the respective coefficients are summed, the yield coefficients are 
negative and significant, while the coefficients for yield squared are positive and 
significant. The result is Figure 3, which displays a U-shaped relation between yields and 
                                                 
17 Note that the models in Table 8 are run via OLS, with White’s standard errors.  Similar qualitative results 
were obtained for robust regressions, although significance levels were lower. Because we are trying to 
illustrate the effect of relatively extreme portfolio yields, the OLS models were more appropriate than 
robust techniques that were likely to downweight such observations.   20
financial self-sufficiency.  For portfolio yields under 40% per annum, which 
characterizes the majority of solidarity group lenders in our sample, the relationship is 
negative.  Had we not imposed the non-linearity by including a separate squared yield 
term for group lenders, the simple linear relation between financial self-sufficiency and 
yield would have been negative. 
Overall, the results in Table 8 suggest that individual-based lenders that charge 
higher interest rates are more profitable than others, but only up to a point.
18  For most 
solidarity group lenders, the reverse seems true.  Their financial performance is worse at 
higher yields.  
Below, we ask how much of this pattern is related to rising loan delinquency.  
Throughout most of our sample range, loan delinquency is more common for individual-
based lenders that charge higher yields (as predicted by theory). However, the evidence is 
more consistent with falling demand at the highest interest rates charged by our 
individual-based lenders—which in turn reduces scale and, ultimately, profitability. 
Again, as predicted, we do not find evidence that profitability is lower at high interest 
rates for group lenders, nor is there a significant relationship between yields and portfolio 
quality. 
Portfolio at risk 
Direct insight into agency problems comes from analyzing determinants of loan 
delinquencies and their relation to interest rates.  Again, we find an inverted U-shaped 
pattern for individual-based lenders.  Table 9 presents the regressions that relate yields to 
portfolio at risk.  We replace the dependent variables in the Table 8 regressions with the 
                                                 
18 The result could be due to reverse causation.  Reducing interest rates (and thus lowering profits) might be 
especially likely when the institution is driven by social objectives or if it seeks to maximize profits but 
faces potential competition.   21
share of the portfolio that is at risk, defined as the share of loans that are delinquent for at 
least thirty days.  Although the significance of the yield variables depends on the 
inclusion of the loans to assets ratio and the for-profit dummy in the specification, the 
non-linearities implied by the profitability models also appear in the portfolio at risk 
regressions for individual-based lenders. Summing the respective squared and linear yield 
variables, there is no significant relationship between yields and portfolio risk for group 
lenders or village banks. 
When we plot the relation between yields and portfolio at risk for individual-
based lenders (see Figure 4), there is a positive relation up to real yields of about 45 
percent.  Beyond that point, however, the share of loans at risk is declining in portfolio 
yield, and 7 to 9 individual-based lenders have yields that high.  Reconciliation with the 
earlier results (showing a downturn in profitability only when real yields surpass about 60 
percent) comes from taking demand also into account.  From Table 1 we know that the 
portfolio yield variable is significantly negatively correlated with size of an institution 
(i.e., total assets) and the ratio of loans to assets, so there is a negative association 
between charging higher interest rates and having a large customer base.  By the same 
token, there is also a significant negative correlation between real yields and average loan 
size (relative to GNP per capita), which indicates that high yield lenders tend to make 
small loans, another reason for seeing the downward pressure on profitability at very high 
yield rates.
19   
  
 
                                                 
19 Note, though, that the benchmark regressions show no general association of average loan sizes and 
financial sustainability.   22
Reducing costs 
For individual-based lenders (and village banks), the base results indicated that financial 
performance was positively linked to labor costs, but negatively linked to capital costs. 
We speculated that this could be a cost-effective strategy if the resources were used to 
identify creditworthy borrowers, who would then be given relatively large loans.  To test 
that proposition, Table 10 offers regressions that relate the total cost per dollar lent to the 
microbank’s average loan size.  We also include the square of average loan size to 
capture potential non-linearities.  The question is the degree to which expanding loan 
sizes improves profitability by lowering average costs.   
  We find that larger loans are associated with lower average costs—but only up to 
a point.  The loan size coefficient is negative and significant in both OLS and robust 
regressions, while loan size squared is positive and significant. The two coefficients 
imply a U-shaped relationship between costs per dollar lent and average loan size for 
individual-based lenders that reaches its minimum for loans two to three times per capita 
GNP (Figure 5).  Note also that only a handful of individual-based lenders exceed the 
minimum. 
  Similar findings hold for group lenders, although they appear to be less able to 
exploit scale economies.  For solidarity group lenders, coefficients for the loan size 
variables are significant and of the same sign as those for individual-based lenders, which 
also implies a U-shaped relationship between costs per dollar lent and loan size (Figure 
6).  However, the magnitudes of those coefficients imply a minimum at the level of GDP 
per capita.  Based on the respective minima for the two groups, individual-based lenders 
seem better able to exploit these scale economies.   23
The patterns for village banks are not robust to the specification.  Results for 
village banks are, in general, estimated with less precision than those for the other types 
of lenders.  In the OLS regressions in Table 10, the loan size variables tend to share the 
same signs as those for individual-based lenders, but are insignificant. In the robust 
regressions, the loan size coefficients are significant, large in magnitude, and of the 
opposite sign of those for individual-based lenders. Future work with a larger data set 
may lead to more robust estimates for village banks, but the present data do not provide a 




Mission drift is a concern for socially-driven microbanks.  As clients mature and develop 
their businesses, the clients should be able to increase loan sizes and their incomes should 
rise.  A successful microbank will thus find that, over time, their clients receive larger 
loans and will be less poor.  The bank’s mission and practices may well need to shift with 
these changes, but the result is not “mission drift” as the term is generally understood. 
  Mission drift, instead, is a shift in the composition of new clients, or a re-
orientation from poorer to wealthier clients among existing clients.  The evidence above 
shows that the concern can not be brushed away easily.  In particular, tensions between 
outreach and sustainability emerged when results were disaggregated by lending type.  
Results from the section above suggest that individual-based lenders (and to a lesser 
extent group lenders) find it cost-effective to increase their average loan size.  In pursuing 
profit, microbanks would then naturally ask whether it can make sense to shift focus to 
                                                 
20 Lacking a firm basis for the choice of specification, we do not present a figure for village banks.   24
wealthier borrowers who can absorb larger loans, even at the sacrifice of outreach to the 
poorest segments in a community.   
The cross-sectional data here are not ideal for addressing mission drift since the 
issues inherently involve adaptation over time.   We focus instead on the relationship 
between outreach and profitability, using a variety of outreach measures as dependent 
variables. Table 11 gives results on the relationship between profitability and three 
common measures of outreach: average loan size/GDP per capita, average loan size/GDP 
per capita of the poorest 20 percent of the population, and the share of loans extended to 
women.  Smaller average loan size is taken as an indication of better outreach to the poor.  
Deflating by GDP per capita both normalizes the loan size variable so that it is no longer 
in terms of local currency and provides an adjustment for the overall wealth of a country.  
In high-inequality countries, GDP per capita is a poor reflection of typical resources for 
households, so normalizing instead by the income accruing to the bottom 20 percent 
should be a better denominator.  It turns out, though, that the results are comparable 
across measures.    
The first result is that, on average, financial self-sufficiency is not significantly 
linked to any of the outreach measures.  This might suggest no mission drift (see models 
1, 4, and 7 in Table 11).  As in much of the rest of the paper, however, the relationship 
between profitability (financial self-sufficiency) and outreach only becomes apparent 
when we allow it to vary by lending type.  When we do this, we find evidence of reverse 
mission drift for individual-based lenders.  On the other hand, we also find that larger 
microbanks tend to have fewer poor customers and serve a greater fraction of men, rather 
than women.     25
In specification 2 in the table, the interaction between profitability and lending 
type is positive and significant for both village banks and group lenders.
21  This does not 
necessarily indicate that village banks and group lenders with relatively high profitability 
lend less to the poor.  When we sum the coefficients for the profitability variable and the 
respective interaction terms, we find that profitability is not significantly linked to the 
average loan size indicators for either type of lender (i.e., there is no evidence of mission 
drift).  However, once those interaction terms are included in the regressions, the 
coefficient for financial self-sufficiency (corresponding to individual-based lenders) 
becomes negative and significant for both average loan size variables in the robust 
regressions (see Appendix B, Table 2).
22 This suggests that individual-based lenders that 
are financially self-sustaining tend to be more focused on the poor. 
Countervailing trends emerge, though, when we push further by investing the role 
of institutions’ age and size.  The correlations in Table 1 indicate that a microbank’s age 
and size are positively related to profitability. Thus, to better isolate the effect of financial 
self-sufficiency on outreach, we control for those two factors in models 3, 6, and 9 (both 
on their own and interacted with lending type). Table 12 offers an overview of those 
results. 
                                                 
21 The positive relationship between FSS and outreach indicators in the simpler specifications (2, 5, and 8) 
is more pronounced in the specifications with the complete set of interactions (3, 6, and 9). Controlling for 
age and size by type of lender, individual-based lenders with relatively high FSS tend to have better 
outreach, an indication perhaps of reverse mission drift.  For village banks and group lenders, FSS appears 
to have little effect on outreach. Their FSS coefficients are opposite in sign to that of the simple FSS 
variable, and the net effect of the two coefficients is not significantly different from zero (except for group 
lenders in the women borrowers specifications). 
 
22 In the yield regressions we highlighted the effects of extreme values on profitability and loan quality, and 
thus the OLS regressions were suitable.  Here we summarize the average relationship between FSS and 
outreach measures, and thus the robust regressions provide helpful checks.   26
The significant positive coefficients for institution size in the average loan 
specifications, and the significant negative coefficients in the specifications on gender, 
indicate that larger individual-based lenders do relatively poorly in terms of outreach. For 
village banks, the interaction with size produces coefficients of the opposite sign of those 
for the simple size variable. Because the magnitudes of the two sets of coefficients are 
similar, size is not significantly associated with outreach for village banks.   
For group lenders, the size coefficients in the average loan size specifications are 
of the same sign as those for village banks, but the magnitudes are substantially smaller. 
The net effect of summing the coefficients for the size variable and the group 
lending*size interaction term is significantly greater than zero, indicating that large group 
lenders have larger average loan sizes.  Similarly, when those coefficients are summed in 
the “women borrowers” specifications, the total effect is significantly less than zero, 
indicating that large group lenders lend less to women.   
Controlling for financial self-sufficiency, age, and size by type of lending, village 
banks and group lenders have much smaller average loan sizes and extend a higher share 
of their loans to women (based on the coefficients for the simple dummy variables for 
those two groups).  However, the interactions between lending type and age, size, and 
FSS reveal more complicated relationships than those dummy variables would suggest.  
The significant positive coefficient for age in the specifications for average loan size 
divided by the GNP per capita of the poorest 20% provides some evidence of mission 
drift over time for individual-based lenders.  For village banks and group lenders, age 
appears to have less association with outreach. For example, in some specifications, 
neither the age variable nor the village bank*age interaction term is significant. In others,   27
the age coefficient is positive and significant, while the interaction is negative and 
significant.  The net effect of the two coefficients is never significantly different from 
zero.   
In sum, outreach appears to be driven by two countervailing influences for 
individual-based lenders.  Size (and to a lesser extent age) is associated with less 
outreach, while profitability is associated with more. On balance, the evidence suggests 
that, as they grow larger, individual-based lenders are more susceptible to mission drift 
than village banks.  Outreach indicators for village banks and group lenders tend not to be 
significantly negatively associated with age, size, or financial self-sufficiency.  For them, 
mission drift would appear to be a less severe concern, although large group lenders do 
have worse outreach than smaller ones.  
 
6. Conclusion 
At the outset of this paper, we sought to address three questions.  Does raising 
interest rates exacerbate agency problems as detected by lower repayment rates and less 
profitability?  Is there evidence of a trade-off between the depth of outreach to the poor 
and the pursuit of profitability?  Has “mission drift” occurred—i.e., have microbanks 
moved away from serving their poorer clients in pursuit of commercial viability? 
Based on a high-quality survey of 124 microfinance institutions, we find that the 
answers to our questions depend on an institution’s lending method.  For example, 
regarding interest rates and profitability, we find that individual-based lenders that charge 
higher interest rates are more profitable than others, but only up to a point.
23 Beyond 
                                                 
23  Again, we acknowledge the possibility of alternative interpretations.  For example, the social objectives 
of some MFIs might compel them to charge lower interest rates and thus reap lower profits.  Those 
institutions might require substantial subsidies to operate, consistent with the negative correlations between   28
threshold interest rates, profitability tends to be lower owing to greater loan delinquency 
(consistent with predictions from agency theory) and, at the highest rates, to falling 
demand for credit. In contrast, for solidarity group lenders financial performance tends to 
worsen as yields increase throughout our sample range.   
Consistent with the economics of information, we also find that individual-based 
lenders with higher labor costs (as a fraction of total assets) are in fact more profitable.  
As loan sizes grow, we hypothesize that these lenders need to be especially careful about 
selecting and monitoring customers, requiring higher labor inputs.  For solidarity group 
lenders, who harness local information to select and monitor customers, we find no 
significant relationship between labor costs and profitability.  
On our second question, regarding trade-offs between outreach to the poor and 
profitability, we find that larger loan sizes are associated with lower average costs for 
both individual-based lenders and solidarity group lenders. Since larger loan size is often 
taken to imply less outreach to the poor, the result could have negative implications.  
However, scale economies are exhausted at relatively low average loan sizes for group 
lenders. For individual-based lenders, the pattern of results might be consistent with more 
troubling interpretations – the personnel expenses devoted to identifying borrowers 
worthy of larger loans could make them less apt to serve the poorest segments of society.  
Yet, this shift in emphasis could also be welfare enhancing because it is not just the 
poorest that demand and can take advantage of better access to finance.   
Moreover, in our base regressions the simple relationship between profitability 
and average loan size is insignificant. Controlling for other relevant factors, institutions 
                                                                                                                                                 
subsidies and profitability in Table 6. However, this would not explain the trade-offs we find for MFIs 
charging relatively high yields.   29
that make smaller loans are not necessarily less profitable.  We also find some positive 
results for individual-based lenders regarding mission drift, the third issue we sought to 
address.  Financially self-sustaining individual-based lenders tend to have smaller 
average loan size and lend more to women, suggesting that pursuit of profit and outreach 
to the poor can go hand in hand.  There are however countervailing influences: larger 
individual-based and group-based lenders tend to extend larger loans and lend less 
frequently to women.  Older individual-based lenders also do poorer on outreach 
measures than younger ones.  While this is not evidence of mission drift in the strict 
sense (i.e., that pursuit of improved financial performance reduces focus on the poor), the 
results for larger and older microbanks are consistent with the idea that as institutions 
mature and grow, they might focus increasingly on clients that can absorb larger loans. 
On the whole, our results suggest that institutional design and orientation matters 
importantly in considering trade-offs in microfinance.  The results underscore the need to 
better understand how contracts function using detailed micro data.   30
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Table 1: Variable Name  Definition Mean St. Dev. Median  Minimum Maximum
Financial Self-Suffiency Adjusted operating revenue / Adjusted (financial 
expense + loan loss provision expense + operating 
expense)
1.035 0.340 1.016 0.146 2.183
Operational Self-Suffiency Operating revenue / (Financial expense + loan loss 
provision expense + operating expense)
1.165 0.413 1.115 0.157 3.872
Return on Assets adjusted Adjusted net operating income after taxes / Average 
total assets
-0.027 0.183 0.002 -1.541 0.280
Average Loan Size to GNP per capita 0.676 0.836 0.376 0.025 5.831
Age Age of the MFI in years 9.300 7.011 8 2 40
Size of MFI Indicator Size of the loan portfolio, which is 1 for small, 2 for 
medium and 3 for large.
2.025 0.710 2 1 3
For-Profit Status  For-profit is 1, non-profit is 0. 0.237 0.427 0 0 1
Village Bank Lender The MFI does village bank style lending (as opposed 
to MFI who do individual lending or solidarity 
lending).
0.165 0.373 0 0 1
Solidarity Lender The MFI does some solidarity style lending (as 
opposed to MFI who do only individual lending or 
do village bank lending.
0.397 0.491 0 0 1
Real Gross Portfolio Yield  (Yield on gross portfolio (nominal) - Inflation rate) / 
(1+ Inflation rate)
0.348 0.191 0.297 0.051 0.976
Capital Costs to Assets (Rent + transportion + depreciation + office + other) 
/ total assets 
18.381 84.939 0.190 0 816.339
Labor Costs to Assets Personnel expenses/total assets 18.553 81.284 0.225 0 747.121
Loans to Assets Gross loan portfolio/total assets 0.689 0.186 0.726 0.077 0.987
Donations to Loan Portfolio Donations for financial services/gross loan portfolio 0.122 0.342 0.005 0 2.081
Average Loan Size to GNP per capita of 
the poorest 20%
2.983 3.939 1.324 0.108 19.511
Average Loan Size In US dollars. 715.698 934.582 360.500 36.000 5131.231
Women Borrowers Percentage of borrowers who are women. 0.649 0.263 0.615 0.150 1
Portfolio Risk Loan Portfolio at risk at 30 days. 0.033 0.044 0.016 0 0.223
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.169 0.377 0 0 1
Africa 0.169 0.377 0 0 1
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.403 0.493 0 0 1
Middle East and North Africa 0.073 0.260 0 0 1
South Asia  0.097 0.297 0 0 1










































Operational  0.8963* 1
Self-Suffiency 124 124
Return on Assets  0.7005* 0.5943* 1
(adjusted) 123 123 123
ALS to GNPPC 0.0726 0.0828 0.1174 1
117 117 117 117
Age 0.2517* 0.1858* 0.1899* 0.1521 1
120 120 119 113 120
Size 0.3655* 0.2962* 0.3517* 0.3408* 0.2285* 1
122 122 121 115 118 122
For-Profit Status  0.0678 -0.0141 0.0929 0.2073* -0.0427 0.2664* 1
118 118 118 112 114 117 118
Village Bank -0.1119 -0.0738 -0.1323 -0.2594* -0.1568 -0.2744*-0.2487* 1
121 121 120 114 117 120 117 121
Solidarity Lender -0.1162 -0.0926 -0.0886 -0.1374 -0.0917 -0.038 0.0575 -0.3608* 1
121 121 120 114 117 120 117 121 121
Portfolio Yield -0.0543 -0.1484 -0.0383 -0.4004* -0.2305*-0.2808*-0.0458 0.4185* -0.1129 1
122 122 122 116 118 120 117 119 119 122
Capital Costs to Assets -0.0975 -0.0659 -0.0411 -0.0731 -0.0411 -0.022 -0.0007 0.0275 0.1502 0.1971* 1
124 124 123 117 120 122 118 121 121 122 124
Labor Costs to Assets -0.1098 -0.0713 -0.0471 -0.0751 -0.0301 -0.029 0.0125 0.0167 0.1799* 0.1678 0.9753* 1
124 124 123 117 120 122 118 121 121 122 124 124
Loans to Assets 0.2758* 0.1383 0.2648* 0.1701 0.0161 0.3284* 0.0267 -0.2011* 0.1067 -0.2732* 0.0263 0.0061 1
124 124 123 117 120 122 118 121 121 122 124 124 124
Donations to Loans  -0.4768* -0.4382* -0.6707* -0.2052* -0.2001*-0.4045*-0.178 0.2294* 0.1023 0.2304* 0.0021 0.0007 -0.4439* 1
124 124 123 117 120 122 118 121 121 122 124 124 124 124
ALS to GNPPC of the 
poorest 20% 0.0012 -0.0077 0.0891 0.8653* 0.3922* 0.3098* 0.0768 -0.2508* -0.2632* -0.4471* -0.0781 -0.0814 0.1157 -0.1682 1
102 102 102 99 98 100 97 99 99 102 102 102 102 102 102
Women Borrowers  -0.1765 -0.2277* -0.2092* -0.3567* -0.1124 -0.3404*-0.2563* 0.3760* 0.3259* 0.2901* 0.0646 0.0876 -0.0091 0.2873* -0.3778*
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Table 3: MFI Lending Style by Region  
Individual Solidarity Village Bank Total
East Asia and Pacific 7 4 0 11
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 8 11 2 21
Latin America 32 10 8 50
Middle East and North Africa 3 3 3 9
South Asia 1 9 2 12
Sub-Saharan Africa 5 11 5 21











































   35
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics by Lending Type
Mean Stndrd. Dev. Mean Stndrd. Dev. Mean Stndrd. Dev.
Financial Self-Suffiency 1.11 0.29 0.98 0.32 0.95 0.47
Operational Self-Suffiency 1.23 0.28 1.12 0.35 1.09 0.75
Return on Assets adjusted 0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.24 -0.08 0.22
Average Loan Size to GNP per capita 1.01 1.10 0.54 0.52 0.20 0.17
Age 11.12 8.67 8.60 5.85 6.95 3.71
Size of MFI Indicator 2.23 0.67 2.00 0.72 1.60 0.60
For-Profit Status  0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00
Real Gross Portfolio Yield  0.31 0.16 0.33 0.14 0.54 0.31
Capital Costs to Assets 2.43 8.62 34.64 126.94 24.07 72.03
Labor Costs to Assets 1.34 4.07 37.13 123.29 22.04 58.09
Loans to Assets 0.70 0.17 0.71 0.20 0.60 0.17
Donations to Loan Portfolio 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.43 0.30 0.47
Average Loan Size to GNP per capita 
of the poorest 20% 4.80 4.92 1.63 1.97 0.63 0.39
Average Loan Size (USD) 1220.23 1184.51 430.98 499.56 148.69 126.61
Women Borrowers 0.46 0.16 0.75 0.24 0.88 0.21
Portfolio Risk 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04
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Solidarity Group (n=48)  27.7  37.3 
Village Banks (n=20)  35.5  23.6 
 













Notes: Subsidized Share of Funding is equal to (subsidized costs of funds adjustment+ in-kind subsidy adjustment + donated equity)/(total 




Table 6: Correlations of Subsidized Share of Funding 
 
  Correlations with: 
 
















-.28** -.17  -.53*** .10  .13  -.08 -.28** 
 
By lending type: 
 
Individual-based  -.19 .02 .14 .14 .12 -.21  -.25* 
Solidarity Group  -.45***  -.45***  -.73***  .25*  .08  -.02  -.28* 
Village  Bank  .22 .27 .10 -.01 .13 .03  -- 
 
Notes: Subsidized Share of Funding is equal to (subsidized costs of funds adjustment+ in-kind subsidy adjustment + donated equity)/(total 
liabilities+ total equity). FSS is financial self-sufficiency, OSS is operational self-sufficiency, and portfolio at risk is the share of loans 
delinquent at least thirty days. There is no variation in profit status for village banks, and thus no correlation can be calculated for that 
variable and our subsidy measures for that group. 
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Table 7: Profitability Regressions
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
Real Yield 0.55 0.607 0.735 0.367 0.383 0.663 0.307 0.336 0.319
[2.92]*** [3.68]*** [3.63]*** [1.73]* [1.94]* [2.81]*** [2.57]** [2.67]*** [2.93]***
Real Yield (Villagebank) -0.675 -0.742 -0.867 -1.124 -1.143 -1.428 -0.281 -0.316 -0.29
[1.40] [1.45] [1.59] [1.26] [1.29] [1.52] [1.89]* [2.05]** [2.05]**
Real Yield (Solidarity)  -0.153 -0.011 -0.236 -0.155 -0.115 -0.558 -0.271 -0.198 -0.218
[0.32] [0.02] [0.41] [0.30] [0.23] [0.89] [1.02] [0.78] [0.81]
Capital Costs to Assets  -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
[4.81]*** [6.24]*** [7.03]*** [5.10]*** [5.25]*** [6.20]*** [2.41]** [3.04]*** [3.16]***
Capital Costs to Assets (Villagebank) -0.049 -0.058 -0.057 -0.089 -0.091 -0.091 -0.027 -0.031 -0.03
[1.84]* [2.03]** [1.99]** [1.65] [1.77]* [1.77]* [1.58] [1.79]* [1.67]*
Capital Costs to Assets (Solidarity) 0.02 0.019 0.022 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.009
[5.26]*** [6.50]*** [6.05]*** [5.03]*** [5.02]*** [3.85]*** [2.81]*** [3.31]*** [3.44]***
Labor Costs to Assets  0.037 0.034 0.037 0.032 0.032 0.038 0.008 0.006 0.007
[6.77]*** [6.31]*** [6.71]*** [4.95]*** [4.76]*** [5.21]*** [1.92]* [1.66] [1.81]*
Labor Costs to Assets (Villagebank) 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.025 0.027 0.022 0.012 0.016 0.015
[0.07] [0.53] [0.34] [0.77] [0.90] [0.74] [1.10] [1.43] [1.28]
Labor Costs to Assets (Solidarity) -0.04 -0.036 -0.04 -0.033 -0.032 -0.039 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009
[7.40]*** [6.79]*** [6.68]*** [5.28]*** [4.88]*** [4.87]*** [2.41]** [2.09]** [2.56]**
Village bank 0.345 0.376 0.407 0.677 0.686 0.758 0.099 0.115 0.105
[1.03] [1.03] [1.08] [1.05] [1.06] [1.15] [1.25] [1.39] [1.35]
Solidarity -0.025 -0.113 -0.041 -0.074 -0.098 0.05 0.04 -0.004 -0.002
[0.15] [0.68] [0.21] [0.40] [0.56] [0.24] [0.62] [0.07] [0.02]
Size Indicator 0.212 0.178 0.19 0.211 0.201 0.23 0.081 0.063 0.059
[4.50]*** [3.84]*** [3.73]*** [3.76]*** [3.10]*** [3.23]*** [3.11]*** [2.74]*** [2.64]***
Log of age 0.144 0.149 0.142 0.157 0.159 0.138 0.082 0.085 0.091
[2.92]*** [3.20]*** [2.79]*** [2.30]** [2.37]** [2.00]** [1.76]* [1.81]* [1.70]*
Average Loan Size to GNP per capita -0.016 -0.018 -0.009 -0.026 -0.026 -0.008 0.01 0.009 0.008
[0.46] [0.56] [0.29] [0.53] [0.55] [0.19] [0.72] [0.70] [0.62]
Loans to assets ratio 0.448 0.421 0.127 0.081 0.23 0.223
[2.43]** [2.29]** [0.39] [0.25] [2.63]** [2.48]**
For-profit dummy -0.082 -0.178 0.007
[0.96] [1.83]* [0.19]
E. Eur. and Ctrl Asia  0.238 0.205 0.193 0.428 0.418 0.384 0.144 0.127 0.136
[2.50]** [2.12]** [1.89]* [3.35]*** [2.92]*** [2.65]*** [1.52] [1.45] [1.39]
Sub. Africa  0.084 0.119 0.119 0.164 0.173 0.191 0.04 0.058 0.042
[0.90] [1.29] [1.15] [1.32] [1.50] [1.53] [0.46] [0.64] [0.48]
Middle East and N. Africa 0.083 0.115 0.104 0.102 0.111 0.08 0.103 0.12 0.126
[0.76] [1.17] [1.03] [0.71] [0.76] [0.54] [1.38] [1.55] [1.49]
South Asia  0.281 0.323 0.327 0.465 0.477 0.481 0.094 0.116 0.118
[1.88]* [2.23]** [2.25]** [1.85]* [2.01]** [2.04]** [1.10] [1.30] [1.30]
East Asia  -0.059 -0.046 -0.028 -0.025 -0.022 0.031 -0.003 0.003 0
[1.00] [0.86] [0.43] [0.41] [0.37] [0.41] [0.08] [0.08] [0.01]
Constant 0.075 -0.175 -0.195 0.19 0.12 0.074 -0.491 -0.619 -0.616
[0.43] [1.12] [1.24] [0.80] [0.62] [0.38] [2.51]** [2.68]*** [2.73]***
Observations 107 107 104 107 107 104 107 107 104
R-squared 0.46 0.5 0.51 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.31 0.35 0.36
All models estimated via OLS, with White's Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 8: Profitability Regressions - Yield side
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
Real Yield 2.072 1.925 1.888 1.978 1.975 1.962 0.582 0.501 0.515
[3.40]*** [3.20]*** [3.08]*** [2.87]*** [2.56]** [2.52]** [2.36]** [2.11]** [2.07]**
Real Yield squared -1.778 -1.488 -1.38 -1.82 -1.804 -1.609 -0.345 -0.189 -0.215
[2.66]*** [2.25]** [2.02]** [2.51]** [2.07]** [1.83]* [1.46] [0.87] [0.91]
Real Yield (Villagebank) -1.612 -1.514 -1.492 -3.233 -3.062 -3.211 -0.338 -0.357 -0.294
[0.98] [0.88] [0.79] [1.03] [1.03] [0.98] [0.63] [0.61] [0.50]
Real Yield (Villagebank) squared 1.496 1.287 1.184 2.802 2.593 2.586 0.276 0.248 0.185
[1.03] [0.87] [0.71] [1.08] [1.07] [0.93] [0.53] [0.44] [0.33]
Real Yield (Solidarity)  -4.925 -4.803 -4.948 -5.067 -5.108 -5.502 -2.809 -2.722 -2.798
[2.98]*** [3.10]*** [3.19]*** [2.87]*** [2.84]*** [2.88]*** [2.06]** [2.06]** [2.04]**
Real Yield (Solidarity) squared 6.113 6.108 6.277 6.283 6.359 6.615 3.288 3.253 3.367
[3.04]*** [3.28]*** [3.47]*** [2.97]*** [3.02]*** [3.06]*** [2.14]** [2.17]** [2.15]**
C a p i t a l  C o s t s  t o  A s s e t s   0 . 0 0 1 0- 0 . 0 0 2 00000- 0 . 0 0 1
[0.55] [0.20] [0.47] [0.33] [0.01] [0.16] [0.33] [0.59] [0.33]
L a b o r  C o s t s  t o  A s s e t s   - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 1 0000000 . 0 0 1
[0.70] [0.45] [0.18] [0.30] [0.01] [0.01] [0.37] [0.57] [0.42]
Village bank 0.317 0.307 0.297 0.753 0.73 0.737 0.016 0.021 0.011
[0.71] [0.63] [0.59] [0.85] [0.84] [0.81] [0.14] [0.16] [0.08]
Solidarity 0.752 0.691 0.71 0.749 0.751 0.834 0.46 0.426 0.435
[2.40]** [2.33]** [2.35]** [2.29]** [2.19]** [2.27]** [2.11]** [2.07]** [2.04]**
Size Indicator 0.202 0.171 0.184 0.193 0.188 0.216 0.077 0.061 0.061
[4.25]*** [3.61]*** [3.61]*** [3.49]*** [2.91]*** [3.08]*** [3.32]*** [2.87]*** [2.74]***
Log of age 0.182 0.186 0.174 0.204 0.206 0.185 0.1 0.101 0.103
[3.33]*** [3.47]*** [3.10]*** [2.53]** [2.59]** [2.31]** [1.90]* [1.92]* [1.81]*
Loans to assets ratio 0.41 0.409 0.049 0.029 0.209 0.21
[1.84]* [1.81]* [0.13] [0.07] [2.32]** [2.32]**
For-profit dummy -0.05 -0.126 -0.002
[0.69] [1.49] [0.06]
E. Eur. and Ctrl Asia  0.209 0.169 0.159 0.37 0.367 0.342 0.128 0.107 0.109
[2.15]** [1.61] [1.51] [3.12]*** [2.51]** [2.37]** [1.47] [1.32] [1.29]
Sub. Africa  0.052 0.07 0.104 0.095 0.091 0.135 0.013 0.025 0.025
[0.50] [0.73] [0.97] [0.81] [0.79] [1.05] [0.16] [0.33] [0.33]
Middle East and N. Africa 0.143 0.181 0.169 0.184 0.189 0.164 0.134 0.153 0.155
[1.57] [2.31]** [2.11]** [1.65] [1.67]* [1.47] [1.65] [1.84]* [1.76]*
South Asia  0.256 0.288 0.295 0.399 0.403 0.415 0.083 0.099 0.101
[1.69]* [1.95]* [1.97]* [1.66]* [1.77]* [1.82]* [0.92] [1.05] [1.05]
East Asia  -0.054 -0.041 -0.068 -0.047 -0.041 -0.033 0.015 0.019 0.007
[0.75] [0.63] [1.06] [0.66] [0.58] [0.44] [0.28] [0.38] [0.13]
Constant -0.238 -0.448 -0.432 -0.15 -0.178 -0.158 -0.555 -0.661 -0.666
[1.10] [2.40]** [2.33]** [0.49] [0.83] [0.74] [2.69]*** [2.82]*** [2.74]***
Observations 113 114 110 113 114 110 113 114 110
R-squared 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.3 0.33 0.33
All models estimated via OLS, with White's Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 9: Portfolio At Risk Regressions
-1 -2 -3
Real Yield 0.199 0.21 0.221
[1.51] [1.77]* [1.91]*
Real Yield squared -0.177 -0.22 -0.271
[1.15] [1.57] [2.19]**
Real Yield (Villagebank) -0.123 -0.123 -0.102
[0.64] [0.67] [0.56]
Real Yield (Villagebank) squared 0.096 0.12 0.136
[0.47] [0.61] [0.74]
Real Yield (Solidarity)  -0.397 -0.41 -0.399
[1.70]* [1.88]* [1.83]*
Real Yield (Solidarity) squared 0.335 0.331 0.356
[1.23] [1.30] [1.44]
Capital Costs to Assets  0.019 0.016 0.013
[0.58] [0.50] [0.42]
Labor Costs to Assets  0.086 0.094 0.09
[1.94]* [2.26]** [2.15]**
Village bank -0.016 -0.011 -0.015
[1.55] [1.22] [1.61]
Solidarity 0.012 0.011 0.016
[1.23] [1.17] [1.71]*
Size Indicator 0 0 0
[0.19] [0.27] [0.79]
Log of age 0 0 0
[0.14] [0.21] [0.51]




E. Eur. and Ctrl Asia  -0.021 -0.015 -0.01
[1.83]* [1.14] [0.73]
Sub. Africa  -0.008 -0.013 -0.015
[0.55] [0.83] [0.93]
Middle East and N. Africa 0 -0.008 -0.003
[0.02] [0.42] [0.16]
South Asia  -0.023 -0.029 -0.029
[1.57] [2.07]** [2.12]**
East Asia  -0.016 -0.019 -0.012
[0.90] [0.90] [0.55]
Constant 0.014 0.059 0.05
[0.46] [1.64] [1.42]
Observations 111 111 108
R-squared 0.15 0.22 0.23
Estimated via OLS, with White's Heteroskedasticity consistent standard error
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Table 10: Cost/Loan Size Trade-offs
-1 -2 -3 -2
Loan Size Indicator  -0.215 -0.238 -0.177 -0.164
[2.55]** [3.08]*** [2.11]** [2.18]**
Loan Size Indicator squared  0.054 0.065 0.041 0.038
[1.93]* [2.61]** [1.76]* [1.81]*
Loan Size*Village bank -0.036 -0.17 5.49 5.561
[0.03] [0.16] [3.80]*** [4.20]***
Loan Size squared*Village bank  -0.079 0.483 -12.964 -12.672
[0.05] [0.40] [3.83]*** [4.06]***
Loan Size*Solidarity  -0.755 -0.505 -0.59 -0.559
[3.36]*** [2.82]*** [3.35]*** [3.49]***
Loan Size squared*Solidarity   0.341 0.215 0.243 0.228
[3.36]*** [2.68]*** [2.77]*** [2.86]***
Village bank dummy  0.178 0.076 -0.207 -0.285
[1.02] [0.52] [1.53] [2.34]**
Solidarity dummy  0.252 0.159 0.218 0.22
[2.48]** [2.11]** [2.90]*** [3.22]***
Size indicator  -0.116 -0.033 -0.043 -0.033
[2.75]*** [1.15] [1.62] [1.32]
Age -0.128 -0.136 -0.14 -0.127
[2.61]** [3.84]*** [4.75]*** [4.78]***
Donations over Loan Portfolio 0.507 0.429
[6.61]*** [8.48]***
E. Eur. and Ctrl Asia  -0.032 -0.1 -0.085 -0.12
[0.33] [1.55] [1.54] [2.38]**
Sub. Africa  0.127 0.094 0.086 0.089
[1.59] [1.50] [1.74]* [1.98]*
Middle East and N. Africa -0.156 -0.229 -0.231 -0.229
[1.31] [2.98]*** [3.78]*** [4.14]***
South Asia  -0.184 -0.202 -0.193 -0.202
[1.68]* [3.03]*** [3.17]*** [3.68]***
East Asia  0.035 0.043 0.039 0.041
[0.47] [0.84] [0.60] [0.70]
Constant 0.916 0.764 0.764 0.696
[7.57]*** [7.37]*** [9.04]*** [8.92]***
Observations 108 108 110 110
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 5 40 . 7 50 . 6 60 . 8 1
Dependent Variable: Cost per dollar lent (Total Expenses over Loan Portfolio)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
t-statistics in parentheses
White's Standard Errors Robust Regressions
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Table 11: Mission Drift
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
Financial Self-Sufficiency  -0.004 -0.515 -1.618 -0.212 -2.22 -6.457 -0.023 0.044 0.27
[0.03] [1.61] [2.44]** [0.27] [0.94] [1.17] [0.27] [0.43] [2.13]**
Village bank -0.883 -1.572 -0.917 -4.197 -7.014 -3.953 0.413 0.667 0.623
[4.22]*** [3.60]*** [1.72]* [5.10]*** [2.49]** [1.36] [6.12]*** [3.94]*** [3.67]***
Solidarity -0.593 -1.474 -1.143 -2.838 -6.344 -5.096 0.28 0.261 0.458
[2.30]** [2.96]*** [1.96]* [3.32]*** [2.15]** [1.73]* [6.10]*** [1.55] [2.63]**
Self-Sufficiency*Village 0.649 1.876 2.645 7.331 -0.267 -0.355
[1.88]* [2.68]*** [1.09] [1.29] [1.44] [2.08]**
Self-Sufficiency*Solidarity 0.841 1.586 3.321 5.985 0.029 -0.033
[2.02]** [2.26]** [1.26] [1.04] [0.19] [0.19]
Age 0.043 0.245 -0.001
[1.50] [2.05]** [0.59]
Age*Village bank -0.075 -0.365 -0.026
[1.98]* [2.34]** [1.44]
Age*Solidarity -0.064 -0.284 0.007
[2.09]** [2.17]** [1.55]
Size Indicator 0.624 2.155 -0.113
[1.72]* [1.30] [2.31]**
Size*Village bank -0.556 -1.949 0.176
[1.60] [1.13] [1.74]*
Size*Solidarity -0.203 -0.523 -0.102
[0.57] [0.30] [1.48]
E. Eur. and Ctrl Asia  0.254 0.189 0.3 -1.538 -1.674 -0.141 -0.082 -0.09 -0.096
[1.35] [0.93] [1.26] [1.70]* [1.64] [0.12] [1.31] [1.40] [1.58]
Sub. Africa  0.234 0.26 0.418 -1.45 -1.347 0.161 -0.029 -0.038 -0.05
[1.28] [1.43] [2.13]** [1.63] [1.52] [0.17] [0.48] [0.64] [0.85]
Middle East and N. Africa -0.312 -0.293 -0.189 -3.17 -3.202 -2.155 -0.023 -0.014 -0.033
[1.91]* [1.84]* [1.00] [3.57]*** [3.71]*** [2.34]** [0.38] [0.20] [0.50]
South Asia  0.332 0.304 0.49 -1.138 -1.27 0.117 0.058 0.06 0.027
[0.62] [0.56] [0.93] [0.88] [0.96] [0.09] [0.60] [0.68] [0.30]
East Asia  -0.276 -0.232 -0.066 -3.093 -2.922 -1.915 0.021 0.011 0.075
[1.46] [1.37] [0.34] [3.54]*** [3.59]*** [1.94]* [0.34] [0.17] [1.07]
Constant 1.019 1.578 0.832 6.007 8.213 4.534 0.497 0.425 0.447
[4.00]*** [3.63]*** [1.58] [4.52]*** [2.81]*** [1.55] [5.03]*** [3.75]*** [3.65]***
Observations 113 113 108 99 99 94 110 110 105
R-squared 0.18 0.2 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.45 0.41 0.44 0.6
All models estimated via OLS, with White's Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Average Loan Size over GNP ALS over GNPPC poorest 20% Women Borrowers  42
Table 12: Summary of Mission Drift Results 















No significant relation 
Size of firm  Larger (10%)  Lower (5%) 
Financial Self-Sufficiency  Smaller (5%)  Higher (5%) 
Solidarity Group Lenders  
Increases in: 
 
Age of firm 
 
 
No significant relation 
 
 
No significant relation 
Size of firm  Larger (1%)  Lower (1%) 




Age of firm 
 
 
No significant relation 
 
 
No significant relation 
Size of firm  No significant relation  No significant relation 
Financial Self-Sufficiency  No significant relation  No significant relation 
 
Notes: Significance levels in brackets. Results refer to models 3,6, and 9 in Table 11. A significant result for loan size implies that the 
coefficient was significant in either model 3 (with dependent variable average loan size over GNP per capita) or model 6 (with dependent 
variable average loan size over the GNP per capita of the poorest 20% of the population), or both.   43
    Appendix A. Financial Statement Adjustments and their Effects 
Adjustment  Effect on Financial Statements   Type of Institution Most Affected by 
Adjustment 
Inflation Adjustment 
of Equity (minus Net 
Fixed Assets) 
Increases financial expense accounts on 
income statement, to some degree offset 
by inflation income account for 
revaluation of fixed assets.  Generates a 
reserve in the balance sheet’s equity 
account, reflecting that portion of the 
MFI’s retained earnings that has been 
consumed by the effects of inflation. 
Decreases profitability and “real” retained 
earnings. 
MFIs funded more by equity than by 
liabilities will be hardest hit, 








Decreases concessionary loan account and 
increases equity account; increases 
inflation adjustment on income statement 
and balance sheet. 
NGOs that have long-term low-
interest “loans” from international 
agencies that function more as 
donations than loans. 
Subsidized cost of 
funds adjustment. 
Increases financial expense on income 
statement to the extent that the MFI’s 
liabilities carry a below-market rate of 
interest. Decreases net income and 
increases subsidy adjustment account on 
balance sheet. 
MFIs with heavily subsidized loans 
(i.e., large lines of credit from 
governments or international 
agencies at highly subsidized rates). 
Subsidy adjustment: 
current-year cash 
donations to cover 
operating expenses 
 
Reduces operating expense on income 
statement (if the MFI records donations as 
operating income). Increases subsidy 
adjustment account on balance sheet. 
NGOs during their start-up phase. 
The adjustment is relatively less 
important for mature institutions. 
In-kind subsidy 
adjustment (e.g. 
donation of goods or 
services: line staff 
paid for by technical 
assistance providers) 
 
Increases operating expense on income 
statement to the extent that the MFI is 
receiving subsidized or donated goods or 
services. Decreases net income, increases 
subsidy adjustment on balance sheet. 
MFIs using goods or services for 
which they are not paying a market-
based cost (i.e., MFIs during their 
start-up phase). 




Usually increases loan loss provision 
expense on income statement and loan 
loss reserve on balance sheet. 
MFIs that have unrealistic loan loss 
provisioning policies. 
Write-off adjustment  On balance sheet, reduces gross loan 
portfolio and loan loss reserve by an equal 
amount, so that neither the net loan 
portfolio nor the income statement is 
affected. Improves (lowers) portfolio-at –
risk ratio. 
MFIs that do not write off non-
performing loans aggressively 
enough. 
Reversal of interest 
income accrued on 
non-performing loans 
Reduces financial income and net profit 
on the income statement, and equity on 
the balance sheet. 
MFIs that continue accruing income 
on delinquent loans past the point 
where collection becomes unlikely, 
or that fail to reverse previously 
accrued income on such loans. 
Source: The Microbanking Bulletin, Our Methodology (www.mixmbb.org/en/company/our_methodology.html)  44
Appendix B Table 1: Profitability Regressions
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
Real Yield 0.552 0.587 0.719 0.312 0.338 0.62 0.137 0.157 0.205
[1.77]* [2.04]** [2.24]** [1.04] [1.09] [1.82]* [1.87]* [2.29]** [2.75]***
Real Yield (Villagebank) -0.217 -0.098 -0.192 0.189 0.145 -0.138 -0.113 -0.187 -0.257
[0.56] [0.27] [0.50] [0.51] [0.38] [0.34] [1.25] [2.20]** [2.85]***
Real Yield (Solidarity)  -0.391 -0.304 -0.638 -0.127 -0.157 -0.937 -0.027 -0.058 -0.171
[0.91] [0.77] [1.42] [0.31] [0.37] [1.96]* [0.27] [0.62] [1.63]
Capital Costs to Assets  -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
[2.66]*** [2.93]*** [2.98]*** [2.26]** [2.06]** [2.11]** [5.02]*** [4.86]*** [4.91]***
Capital Costs to Assets (Villagebank) -0.027 -0.038 -0.037 -0.028 -0.04 -0.044 -0.049 -0.055 -0.056
[0.80] [1.22] [1.17] [0.88] [1.19] [1.31] [8.90]*** [10.53]***[10.80]***
Capital Costs to Assets (Solidarity) 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.008
[2.90]*** [2.98]*** [3.01]*** [2.18]** [1.84]* [1.81]* [5.40]*** [5.03]*** [4.75]***
Labor Costs to Assets  0.039 0.034 0.038 0.041 0.036 0.039 0.008 0.006 0.007
[2.88]*** [2.74]*** [2.93]*** [3.15]*** [2.64]*** [2.84]*** [2.60]** [2.13]** [2.43]**
Labor Costs to Assets (Villagebank) -0.009 0.003 0 -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.025 0.03 0.029
[0.31] [0.12] [0.01] [0.23] [0.18] [0.14] [5.46]*** [6.87]*** [6.73]***
Labor Costs to Assets (Solidarity) -0.042 -0.036 -0.041 -0.041 -0.035 -0.039 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008
[3.08]*** [2.85]*** [3.05]*** [3.16]*** [2.56]** [2.71]*** [2.96]*** [2.38]** [2.68]***
Village bank -0.003 -0.11 -0.106 -0.282 -0.288 -0.21 0.026 0.068 0.096
[0.02] [0.60] [0.55] [1.48] [1.45] [1.04] [0.57] [1.55] [2.16]**
Solidarity 0.095 -0.016 0.092 0.005 -0.056 0.191 0.016 0.002 0.037
[0.59] [0.11] [0.55] [0.03] [0.34] [1.07] [0.43] [0.04] [0.95]
Size Indicator 0.197 0.158 0.172 0.152 0.153 0.195 0.03 0.026 0.03
[4.24]*** [3.59]*** [3.64]*** [3.40]*** [3.20]*** [3.89]*** [2.72]*** [2.44]** [2.76]***
Log of age 0.153 0.137 0.134 0.087 0.078 0.067 0.044 0.042 0.039
[2.99]*** [2.92]*** [2.69]*** [1.79]* [1.53] [1.27] [3.68]*** [3.80]*** [3.38]***
Average Loan Size to GNP per capita -0.008 -0.021 -0.013 0.004 -0.01 0.001 0 -0.003 0
[0.20] [0.57] [0.34] [0.11] [0.26] [0.02] [0.02] [0.32] [0.01]
Loans to assets ratio 0.6 0.561 0.415 0.369 0.147 0.14
[4.02]*** [3.64]*** [2.57]** [2.27]** [4.13]*** [3.91]***
For-profit dummy -0.092 -0.174 -0.031
[1.16] [2.08]** [1.66]*
E. Eur. and Ctrl Asia  0.168 0.107 0.09 0.323 0.254 0.2 0.042 0.016 0.003
[1.76]* [1.21] [0.98] [3.55]*** [2.66]*** [2.05]** [1.89]* [0.76] [0.15]
Sub. Africa  0.028 0.083 0.079 -0.009 0.047 0.084 0.017 0.034 0.032
[0.31] [0.98] [0.87] [0.10] [0.51] [0.87] [0.83] [1.70]* [1.53]
Middle East and N. Africa 0.178 0.194 0.192 0.25 0.216 0.201 0.045 0.039 0.03
[1.65] [1.96]* [1.87]* [2.43]** [2.02]** [1.85]* [1.78]* [1.66] [1.27]
South Asia  0.123 0.235 0.259 0.049 0.141 0.208 0.042 0.062 0.061
[1.22] [2.52]** [2.72]*** [0.51] [1.40] [2.06]** [1.79]* [2.81]*** [2.78]***
East Asia  -0.075 -0.042 -0.005 -0.05 -0.029 0.04 -0.022 -0.015 -0.006
[0.62] [0.38] [0.04] [0.43] [0.24] [0.29] [0.79] [0.56] [0.21]
Constant 0.078 -0.194 -0.221 0.475 0.234 0.137 -0.21 -0.298 -0.304
[0.39] [0.96] [1.07] [2.47]** [1.07] [0.62] [4.51]*** [6.21]*** [6.34]***
Observations 106 106 103 106 106 103 107 107 104
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 4 60 . 5 60 . 5 70 . 4 60 . 4 80 . 5 30 . 7 50 . 7 80 . 8
All regressions estimated via Robust Regression in STATA.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Financial                   
Self-Sufficiency
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Appendix B Table 2: Mission Drift
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
Financial Self-Sufficiency  0.069 -0.424 -0.684 0.099 -1.12 -10.084 0.04 0.032 0.298
[0.63] [2.26]** [2.36]** [0.26] [1.72]* [11.61]*** [0.67] [0.31] [2.58]**
Village bank -0.458 -1.057 -0.48 -1.422 -3.07 -4.448 0.472 0.398 0.502
[4.16]*** [3.67]*** [1.20] [3.78]*** [3.04]*** [3.53]*** [7.58]*** [2.43]** [2.84]***
Solidarity -0.309 -0.984 -0.564 -0.82 -2.667 -5.148 0.276 0.303 0.611
[3.43]*** [3.48]*** [1.50] [2.76]*** [2.66]*** [4.25]*** [5.83]*** [1.93]* [3.95]***
Self-Sufficiency*Village 0.585 0.964 1.509 11.027 0.085 -0.195
[2.22]** [2.28]** [1.68]* [8.53]*** [0.57] [0.97]
Self-Sufficiency*Solidarity 0.672 0.854 1.722 10.157 -0.031 -0.12
[2.60]** [2.35]** [1.88]* [9.08]*** [0.22] [0.82]
Age -0.002 0.341 -0.001
[0.25] [14.16]*** [0.25]
Age*Village bank -0.012 -0.428 0.002
[0.31] [3.27]*** [0.07]
Age*Solidarity -0.021 -0.371 0.003
[1.52] [8.55]*** [0.56]
Size Indicator 0.432 3.136 -0.109
[3.58]*** [8.93]*** [1.94]*
Size*Village bank -0.435 -3.061 0.074
[1.90]* [4.11]*** [0.69]
Size*Solidarity -0.161 -2.109 -0.115
[1.03] [4.36]*** [1.65]
E. Eur. and Ctrl Asia  0.298 0.202 0.108 -0.125 -0.288 -0.293 -0.068 -0.063 -0.098
[2.58]** [1.83]* [0.77] [0.35] [0.81] [0.70] [1.15] [1.06] [1.72]*
Sub. Africa  0.292 0.233 0.336 0.119 0.063 1.051 -0.023 -0.019 -0.016
[2.57]** [2.17]** [2.61]** [0.26] [0.14] [2.15]** [0.38] [0.31] [0.28]
Middle East and N. Africa -0.11 -0.124 -0.23 -1.073 -1.141 -1.278 -0.034 -0.038 -0.023
[0.76] [0.91] [1.42] [2.12]** [2.30]** [2.34]** [0.45] [0.49] [0.33]
South Asia  -0.009 -0.067 -0.085 -0.759 -0.878 -0.646 0.197 0.213 0.134
[0.06] [0.52] [0.56] [1.70]* [2.00]** [1.33] [2.75]*** [2.93]*** [2.00]**
East Asia  -0.041 0.013 0.032 -0.514 -0.431 -0.97 0.026 0.029 0.141
[0.31] [0.10] [0.19] [1.21] [1.03] [1.85]* [0.37] [0.41] [1.93]*
Constant 0.509 1.053 0.472 2.193 3.607 4.811 0.424 0.431 0.399
[3.78]*** [4.96]*** [1.66]* [4.82]*** [4.89]*** [5.30]*** [5.76]*** [3.60]*** [3.37]***
Observations 113 113 108 99 99 94 110 110 104
R-squared 0.25 0.29 0.42 0.25 0.3 0.89 0.49 0.5 0.66
All regressions estimated via Robust Regression in STATA.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%





































Figure 1: Return on assets (ROA), real gross portfolio yield, and total expense ratio 
by lending type 
 














Village Banks  Group lenders 
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lenders   47
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Figure 2. Portfolio Yields and Financial Self-Sufficiency, Individual Lenders   48
Predicted Trade-off between Financial Self-sufficiency and Gross Yields for Median Solidarity Group Lender, 
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Figure 4: Portfolio Yield and Portfolio at Risk at 30 Days, Individual Lenders   50
Predicted Trade-off between Average Loan Size and Total Costs for Median Individual Lender, from Table 10, 
Model 2









































































Figure 5: Trade-off, Average Loan Size and Operating Expenses, Individual Lenders   51
Predicted Trade-off between Average Loan Size and Total Costs for Median Solidarity Group Lender, from 










































































Figure 6: Trade-off, Average Loan Size and Operating Expenses, Solidarity Group Lenders 
 